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Article 2

Dieska: Intuitivism

Intuitivism

Joseph Dieska
In 1904-1905 a young professor of St. Petersburg University (Russia) , Nicholas
Onufriyevich Losskyl published his study entitled "The Substantiation of Mystical
Empiricism." The work appeared in the Russian philosophical journal Voprosy Filosofii i
Psichologii (Problems of Philosophy and Psychology) and was later published in book
form with the title The Substantiation of Intuitivism (1906). In this study Professor
Lossky presented his new approach to the basic epistemological questions. The technique
he used was two-fold ; (1) to justify the natural-realistic attitude toward man's knowledge
of reality ; (2) to complement this attitude by a proper psychological and epistemological
analysis of our consciousness and thus to purge naive realism of its naivete.
Professor Lossky showed in the introductory chapters of his work that the attempts to
solve epistemological difficulties emerging from the rationalistic and empiricistic solutions
led to even more serious problems after Immanuel Kant and his idealistic followers
applied the phenomenalistic method to man's knowledge. Lossky concentrated in
particular on the so-called "causal theory" of perception which, in his judgment, was the
common ground of all epistemological theories from Descartes to the more recent schools
of Critical Realism, Idealism and Empiricism. He exempted from this criticism only
medieval Scholastic and Thomistic realism which stressed the spontaneity and
immateriality of knowledge rather than the dependence of the knowing subject on the
physical-physiological processes taking place outside as well as within the body.
According to Lossky, the epistemological consequences of the causal theory of
perception were Idealism, Subjectivism and Solipsism.
Professor Lossky's basic views were later developed into a solid epistemological
position which began to attract the attention of philosophers in Europe and in America.
His books have been translated into the major foreign languages and are the principal
source of information regarding his theory. Among them the English-speaking student has
at his disposal the following English translations of Lossky's works: The Intuitive Basis of

Knowledge; Sensory, Intellectual and Mystical Intuition; A History of Russian
Philosoph.y; The Absolute Criterion of Truth; Freedom of the Will; Value and Existence;
Creative Activity; Evolution and Ideal Being and other papers and studies. Remaining
works by Lossky are available in Russian, German, French, Czech, Slovak.
We shall present here Lossky's theory of knowledge in a simplified form as found in
the above mentioned works, keeping in mind the scope of our preceding synoptic
treatment of ep istemological problems and the refere nces made to this appendix.
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A. Intuitivism as Universal Empiricism
Professor Lossky's epistemology is basically realistic. It is also empirical in the sense
that it derives all knowledge from extramentally existing reality. It is therefore opposed
to all forms of apriorism, idealism and rationalism which hold, to some extent at least,
that the knowing subject produces its knowledge independen tly of the objects existing
ou tside man's mind. To express this characteristic feature of his theory of knowledge,
Lossky named it universal empiricism. The adjective universal was supposed to indicate
the difference between his theory and that of the Anglo-American empricists which was
known as subjective or sensualistic empiricism (John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, George
Berkley, David Hume and others).
The term universal, added to Lossky's empiricism, can be fully understood only if we
are acquainted with his metaphysical interpretation of the nature and structure of being
and with his organic view of the entire material universe. This metaphysical concept of
reality Lossky developed in his other metaphysical writings the most comprehensive of
which is The World as an Organic Whole (in Russian, 1917). According to Lossky, the
nature and structure of reality is idea-realistic. It consists, first of all, of ideal, i.e.
supra-temporal and supra-spatial entities which are responsible for the existence and
activities of real or spatio-temporal beings. Ideal beings are thus the necessary conditions
of real beings for without them no real being would be possible.
Ideal beings are of two types: (1) abstract-ideal beings and (2) concrete-ideal beings.
Abstract-ideal beings are formal principles and ideas such as mathematical ideas which do
not have the power to act or create and are only the content of concrete-ideal beings or
principles.
"I call Abstract Ideal Realism the position that admits only abstract-ideal principles,
ideas; while Concrete Ideal-Realism recognizes in addition to these abstract-ideal
principles the concrete ideal principles as well. To the realm of abstract-ideal being belong
ideas, i.e. all ideal principles incapable of existing independen tly of other beings such as
mathematical ideas of equality, number, etc. Ideas may be either formal, i.e. existing only
in our thought or material as for example color, humanity, etc. Ideas in themselves are
not active; they are not living realities; they are mere forms or contents of living beings.
Concrete-ideal principles are beings existing relatively independently of other beings.
They are living active entities that exist above time and space yet show themselves
through their activities in the lower spheres of beings such as are various psychic and
material processes present in the universe. The content of a concrete ideal being cannot
be exhausted by any sum-total of abstract ideas, properties, capabilities or potentialities.
A very widely known and easily understood example of a concrete-ideal being is the soul
or spirit conceived as substance, or, as I prefer to call it, a "substantial agent", to stress its
creative activity. (N . O. Lossky, A Popular Introduction to Philosophy , Russian original,
Frankfurt A.M., Possev, 1956, p. 199).
Abstract-ideal forms or principles and concrete-ideal beings are organically joined
together and they represent one living, organic whole in which everything is immanent in
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everything. This metaphysical immanentism is the ontological condition and basis for the
proper understanding of Lossky's intuitivistic epistemology. Concrete-ideal substantial
agents are the creations of God who is the only absolute concrete-ideal principle. He is
responsible for all other abstract-ideal ideas, forms and principles as well as for all
relative-concrete-ideal beings found in the universe. Without God, who is the center of
Lossky's dynamic metaphysics, nothing would exist and nothing could act. The universe
without God would not be a living, organic unity of cosmic, psychic, and material
processes in which mechanistic laws prevail. But neither would the full understanding of
such principles as causality, finality, and unifor~ity of nature be possible without God
who is the absolute unifying and vivifying principle of everything in the universe.
In this organismic perspective we see how Lossky's epistemological theory of
Intuitivism can be called universal empiricism. As he explains it, the universal empiricistic
character of his theory of knowledge is derived from the ontological fact that whatever
the knowing subject knows, through the senses or the intellect, is always known as
something "given" to the subject and not as created or produced by the senses or mind.
In other words, every form of our knowledge is a series of acts, performed by the
knowing subject through which activities we intuit the reality as something different from
ourselves and from the activities performed by us.
Lossky has chosen the term Intuitivism to stress the fact of directness or immediate
reach of the objects known 2 • This is the true meaning of his term intuition which he
employs in different types of knowledge such as are sensory, intellectual, mystical, etc.
intuitions. But while the traditional subjective empiricists restricted their direct or
immediate contact between the knowing subject and the given reality to the psychic
contents of consciousness, Lossky made his universal empiricism to comprise the
extramental entities and to make them the contents of consciousness. He accused
subjective empiricists of approaching the structure of consciousness from the wrong end,
i.e. from the exaggerated dependence of the knowing subject on the processes originating
in the extramental reality and affecting the subject of knowledge, while the spontaneity
of the subject and its intentional acts remained neglected or completely denied. This false
approach Lossky characterized as subjectivization and psychologization of consciousness
and its cause he designated as the "causal theory" of perception.

B. The Analysis of Consciousness
According to Intuitivism our consciousness is not a complex of purely subjective,
psychic processes pertaining to the knowing subject. It is not synonymous with the mind
or the intellect as understood by the rationalist and empiricist epistemologists. It is a
"sphere" in which both the subject and external reality participate and are present. The ,
term consciousness or awareness, according to Lossky, must not be subjectivized, i.e. it
must not be used to indicate mere acts of the subject or its individual states of mind,
emotions and will. It must be referred to and include equally the object representing the
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contents of consciousness. The analysis of the knowing situation proves this
understanding of the structure of consciousness to be the only proper description of its
nature. We all know that our knowledge is always about something. It is always aimed at
or towards some object, be this a material, physical thing or an immaterial idea, relation
or principle. And since this is the true nature of our knowledge, we must get rid of the
false impression that our consciousness cannot transcend its merely subjective and
psychic orbit and reach the transsubjective reality in its original form and existence.
Lossky stressed this objectivistic view of consciousness long before some contemporary
phenomenologistic philosophers such as Edmund Husser!, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty Jean Paul Sartre and their younger followers developed their
phenomenological psychology and analysis. His treatment of the problem was, however,
based on his epistemological and logical reflective method by means of which he was able
to distinguish between logical, psychological and ontological components of our
knowledge and of our consciousness. Lossky placed his "coordinational" theory of
consciousness and knowledge between two extreme positions; (1) psychologization of
consciousness by which he meant a complete reduction of our consciousness to psychic
states and activities of subject; (2) materialization of consciousness, according to which
method all components of consciousness are nothing but physical and physiological
processes taking place in man's body, outside it, and in the brain as the center of the
entire nervous system. The first tendency leads to idealism, subjectivism, solipsism; the
other is represented by extreme forms of materialism, positivism and naturalism in the
history of philosophy.
Both of these erroneous interpretations of consciousness were, according to Lossky,
inspired by the uncritical acceptance of the "causal theory" of knowledge, whose origins
lead back to Democritus and to his theory of "flying particles or atoms". Another cause
of such an erroneous understanding of the nature of our consciousness is, according to
Lossky's analysis, the false ontology of many philosophies which refuse to admit the
ideal-realistic structure of reality. This new concept of consciousness Lossky developed
with an unsurpassing clarity and simplicity. Nevertheless it has provoked many
misunderstandings and false criticisms of Intuitivism. The main reason for opposition to
Lossky's Intuitivism is his admission of external, material objects into the consciousness
in their original. Despite the fact that the concept of consciousness developed by Lossky
does not justify any confusion and unclarity, one encounters a stubborn instistence on
the impossibility of admitting any physical object into the consciousness the way Lossky
describes it. According to such critics, the external material object can enter our
consciousness only indirectly or through the medium of internal representations, copies,
replicas, created in consciousness and representing the original object existing outside
consciousness. Lossky reminds his critics that they must not identify the knowing subject
with the consciousness, nor must they think that our knowledge is composed exclusively
of a series of psychic acts performed by the subject alone . If we keep in mind the
distinction between the subject and its consciousness, we shall see no contradiction or
impossibility of knowing the original extramental object and its "presence in the
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consciousness" is not the same expression as the presence of the material, physical object
"in the subject" as such. This means, as Lossky clarifies, that the extramental tree in
front of my window remains still in his original physical place and does not move from it
into my head or brain; it enters my consciousness in its original in the sense that I, as the
knowing subject, am capable of transcending my physical bodily subjectivity by means of
the intentional, immaterial acts of sensation, perception and attention and reach the
object directly as it is outside me.
This same truth Lossky expressed in his works by stating that the immanence in the
consciousness of an external object does not make that object immanent in the subject
because the sphere of consciousness is of a transcending nature, i.e. it goes beyond the
subject outside to the object. Thus the object of knowledge can become immanent in our
consciousness while at the same time it remains transcendent to the subject of knowledge.
To think that the object cannot be known directly or in its original if it remains
transcendent to the subject means to think of these terms in psychologistic and
subjectivistic way. Intuitivism, according to Lossky, overcomes the error of psychologism
and leads beyond such narrowness of understanding the consciousness of the knowing
subject to the reality attained by the intentional acts of the soul, which is the spiritual,
immaterial center of man's subjectivity. Our soul, or the knowing I, being a concrete-ideal
substantial agent possessing supratemporal and supraspatial qualities, can and does
transcend the dimensions of time and space and thus reaches the original object. From
this point of view the Intuitivistic theory of knowledge is absolutely consistent with itself
and does not contain any logical absurdity or contradiction as some of its superficial
cri tics main tain.
Professor Lossky has conceived and interpreted all types of man's knowledge in terms
of his activistic psychology and intuitivistic epistemology. He saw the same structuring
and functioning of the basic elements representing man's nature not only in our sensory
perception but also in our abstractive or intellectual knowledge. This means that,
according to Lossky, our intellect consists of intellectual, immaterial acts performed by
the soul and intuits directly or immediately its object. Thus Intuitivism can be classed
among the so-called Immediate or Direct Realistic theories in contemporary
epistemology. Moreover, because Lossky has also worked out the metaphysical basis for
his epistemology with a degree of thoroughness not to be found in any ot the schools
related to it, we consider Lossky's theory of knowledge to be the most adequate realistic
interpretation of knowledge available today.

C. The Criticism of the "Causal Theory of Perception"
We have mentioned already that one of the reasons why some philosophers could nq.t
find satisfactory solutions to epistemological problems was their exclusive or exaggerated
dependence on the causal influence of the physiological processes originated by external,
physical objects and affecting or "stimultaning" the knowing subject. Lossky pointed to
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this undue emphasis on the causal conditions of perception in his thesis for the M.A.
degree in philosophy written in 1903 and entitled "The Basic Doctrines of Psychology
from the Standpoint of Voluntarism". In this work Lossky pointed out the role and
importance for every psychic activity of man's free will which is fundamentally
responsible for all acts the soul or I performs and which activities, although conditioned
by other physiological processes, cannot be reduced or subdued by the processes of
physiology and physics taking place in our somatic organic structure.
Lossky knew, however, that in order to be able to substantiate and justify his later
completed theory he had to work out such an ontology which would fit into his
epistemological concept of knowledge. Thus, as it has been outlined already, he had to
look for his ideal-realistic metaphysics in the schools of the old Platonic, Neo-Platonic,
Plotinean and Augustinean tradition. Of the modern philosophers Leibniz exercized the
strongest influence on him in particular with the doctrine on monads and with the
dynamic theory of matter.
This dynamic view of reality inspired Lossky to bring back into epistemology the
traditional concepts of spirituality and intentionality inherited from the medieval
Schoolmen. Expressed in these terms, Lossky's Intuitivism was not only more
spiritualistic than other physiologistic theories of perception but also more congruent and
compatible with the dualistic Christian worldview in which spirituality and materiality are
clearly distinct as two ontologically different realms of being. Having struggled with the
problem of materialism for many years, Lossky finally discovered that materialistic
solutions of philosophical problems must be totally rejected as scientifically and critically
untenable. In Lossky's view they were contrary to our everyday experience and to exact
scientific observations. He overcame his personal inclination and sympathies with
materialism and undertook a very careful examination of the psychological and
epistemological aspects of human knowledge on a non-materialistic basis. The result of
this examination was the positive discovery of the dualistic-nature of our perceptory
processes representing perception and sensation which Lossky found remarkably
correspondent with the pre-philosophic, common sense views which are also reflected in
the basic attitude of the Christian outlook upon world and life.
Thus, as we can read in his post-humously published Memoirs, Lossky embarked upon
the road toward a totally new phase in his philosophic development. In epistemology, this
new phase meant the sharp rejection of all those theories that conceived of knowledge as
a complex of purely physical and physiological processes, where the term psychic was
used to indicate but a certain, not clearly defined epi-phenomenon of the physical and
physiological realities. The exaggerated importance ascribed to these elements of our
knowledge was, in the opinion of Lossky, the cause of the untenable consequences which
followed from such a materialistic and monistic solution. Lossky showed with convincing
force that epistemological Idealism, which contradicts our natural and pre-philosophic
belief in the existence of extramental reality, was a necessary outcome of the so-called
"Principle of Immanence". This principle, according to which we can know only the
contents of our consciousness, or the objects immanent in the consciousness (the
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sense-data) is in turn the logical consequence of what Lossky termed the "causal theory"
of perception. This theory again was the result of an incorrect analysis of consciousness;
for this analysis itself must, according to Lossky, reveal to our mind the presence in the
consciousness not only of subjective elements but equally, if not even more evidently,
objective elements as well. Lossky pointed out, for instance, the generally acknowledged
fact that in our consciousness the subject is somehow pre-reflexively aware first and
foremost of the existence and qualities of the object. The existence of the acting subject, as
well as the intentional and immaterial nature of its psychic acts, become known only
upon further reflective acts such as the acts of attention, analyzing, comparing, judging,
etc. From such an analysis it becomes evident that our knowledge does not consist in
materiality alone but that the material processes are only a necessary "condition" or
"stimuli" to use the term introduced by Henry Bergson, for the psychic, intentional acts
of our soul or our spiritual 1. This distinction, made by many philosophers before Lossky,
has been overlooked and neglected by philosophers following the "causal theory" of
perception.
Lossky rejected "causal theory" mainly because it did not correspond to the findings
of his own epistemological analysis of consciousness which he considered the basic and
most reliable method of epistemology. The knowing subject, he argued, is directly and
immediately aware that it perceives, for instance, the tree in front of the window, that he
turns his eyes, ears and the whole of his psychophysical organism toward that tree, and
that his mind, memory, imagination even his emotions and will are somehow focused on
that observed tree with a simultaneity which can be reduced to separate psychological
and physical-physiological processes only by a particular analysis in which attention is
focused on individual activities in a certain chronological order.
The "causal theory" overlooks the immaterial processes or degrades them to such an
extent that the essence of knowledge is seen not in these processes themselves but rather
in the material physical-physiological conditions of perception. Why is it, asked Lossky,
that we do not perceive first and directly our own subjective acts? Descartes was right in
stating in his "cogito ergo sum" the necessary existence of the thinking subject inherent
in thinking. But he was wrong in overlooking the same selfpre.ence of external reality in
our thinking about the external world. The Materialist philosopher falls into another
extreme when he neglects or denies the presence of spiritual and immaterial elements in
knowledge, or when he uncritically and dogmatically interprets their psychic nature in
terms of materialistic physiology thereby reducing psychic phenomena to physics and
chemistry.
Lossky, whose university training began with the study of biological sciences, knew
that his epistemological views were directed not only against other philosophical schools
but also against many scientific theories in biology, physiology and, particularly,
psychology whose dogmatic axioms were totally false and derived from the positivisticand materialistic pre-sentiments of individual scientists. This awareness, however, only
encouraged Lossky in his opposition to all materialistic and monistic presuppositions of
the natural sciences.
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On the positive side, Lossky's Intuitivism is the theory that brings dualism in ontology
to its ultimate consequences. It defends spirituality and materiality in all philosophical
provinces and supports it by an anlytical and empirical method applied to the facts given
in our immediate consciousness. Because of this dualism such antinomies as were
discovered and encountered for instance in Kant, or the difficulties inherent in the "copy
theory" of contemporary Critical Realists and Idealists, are eliminated from Lossky's
theory of knowledge.
These laudatory characterizations of Intuitivism, however, must not be understood as
if Intuitivism had answers to all epistemological problems. Lossky rightly taught that all
psycho-material realm of being was evolutionary, that it moved ahead, grew and changed
continuously. For this reason he admitted that our knowledge must likewise increase,
improve. Lossky differed, however, from many contemporary evolutionistic and
mobilistic philosophers in one very significant point. He also recognized the existence
of ideal beings that do not change or grow. These ideal beings are subject to the direct
control of the Absolute Concrete-Ideal Principle, God. They are the unchangeable basis
for everything that remains identical and endures every change. In epistemology , the
Intuitivism of Professor Lossky defends the possibility of absolute truths and values not
in regard to the totality and universality of the reality to be known but in the traditional
sense of truthfulness or unconditioned certitude and validity of human knowledge in
regard to particular aspects of reality, and in regard to particular elements and aspects of
reality. Lossky repeatedly emphasized the fragmentariness of man's knowledge. But he
also showed with supreme epistemological clarity that the fragmentariness of man's
knowledge does not mean relativism nor is an obstacle to our recognition of absolutely
certain and valid knowledge.

D. Lossky's Intuitivism and Bergson's Organistic Actualism
In a brochure published in 1922 under the title Bergson's Intuitive Philosophy,
Professor Lossky showed the essential doctrines of the French philosopher Henri Bergson
and the differences between Bergson's Intuitionism and his own Intuitivism. Lossky
recognized Bergson's actualistic and dualistic understanding of human nature as well as
the evolutionistic metaphysical views derived from certain cosmic and biological
observations. Lossky has not, however, accepted all metaphysical and epistemological
views advanced by Bergson. He opposed Bergson's degradation of intellectual knowledge.
But the main objective of this brochure was to show the different meaning of the term
intuition as used by Lossky and as described and interpreted by Bergson.
While Lossky used the term intuition to indicate the intuitive nature of all knowing
actlV1tles and processes and distinguished different types of intuition according to
different powers or faculties and according to different classes of the objects known
(sensory, intellectual, mystical, esthetical and axiological intuition), Bergson's intuition
was a specific faculty enabling man to penetrate into the essence of reality and to reach
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the "duree" or "duration" of the ever flowing stream of events. This faculty to
immediately grasp and behold reality hidden so to speak behind the sensorily and
intellectually perceived and conceptually expressed aspects of reality was in Bergson's
view superior to both the senses and the intellect. And although he defined it as
"intellectual sympathy", he considered it at the same time to be distinct from both the
intellect and the senses.
Lossky, as we have seen, has developed his epistemological theory in harmony with his
metaphysics of Personalistic Idea-Realism. Personalistic metaphysics, according to
Lossky, is any world view that holds that the ultimate reality must be described in terms
of a personal being, i.e. a being endowed with intelligence and free will if only in a very
rudimentary form. Intelligence and freedom of will may differ in degree according to
different stages of perfection and evolution in the general hierarchy of the cosmic order,
yet every such being, no matter how low its rank or place in the cosmic hierarchy, must
possess some signs of intelligence and freedom. Such basic personalistic characteristics
can, in Lossky's view, be found in Leibniz's monads. From his metaphysical standpoint
Lossky saw in Bergson's organic actualism shortcomings that vitiated Bergson's
epistemology in spite of the great merits which Lossky recognized therein.
The following are quotations taken from Lossky's A Popular Introduction to
Philosophy (1956) in which Lossky evaluated Bergson's views:
"By his rejection of the causal theory of perception and of the causal theory of
memory, in particular, by his teaching that physiological processes in the brain and in
perception, as well as in cases of memory-images, are not the cause of the perceived and
remembered content of consciousness, but only the stimulus directing the attention of
the subject to the original object of the external world, or to the past event, Bergson has
laid the foundation for the epistemological justification of metaphysical questions.
Unfortunately, his epistemology suffers from serious shortcomings; it represents
epistemological dualism because it creates an abyss between the discursive thinking of the
intellect which Bergson considers to be only symbolic, and the intuitive grasp of the
compact, creative, changing, living reality. Science, which uses the intellect, gives us
intellectual knowledge (subjected to the principles of identity, contradiction and of
excluded third) but which is a subjective construct of the human intellect; intuition gives
us knowledge about genuine living reality. Bergson says that no concept can convey
knowledge of original reality such as person, life, motion, etc. Thus la duree (creative
mutability) cannot be understood either through the concept of singularity or through
the concept of multiplicity, nor through any synthesis of such concepts ....
If this extreme irrationalism of Bergson were true, it would mean that living reality
could not be expressed in words. This irrationalism of Bergson originated in an erroneous
interpretation of the principle of identity, contradiction and the excluded third .... The
intellect, says Bergson, forms universal abstract concepts from the objects upon thecomparison and analysis of the elements common to all of them; these concepts are not
only outside time but also separated from one another; they express something that
repeats itself an infinite number of times, while the living, genuine reality is an indivisible
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continuity not repeating itself but changing creatively. As a matter of fact, the creatively
changing being is in every moment of its life something sharply determined, i.e. distinct
from other elements of the world and thus subjected to the principles of identity,
contradiction and the excluded third, which principles do not obstruct continuity and
creative mutability. The intellect performs its analysis on the whole grasped intuitively
and, if thus abstracted element is seen against the background of the whole, then we
cannot speak of onesidedness in knowledge. Moreover, comparison and analysis lead not
only to knowledge of the universals but also to knowledge of the individuals. Knowledge
of parts or of particular aspects of the whole does not destroy knowledge of the whole
but rather by putting together parts and the whole we are led to knowledge of the whole.
In primary intuition the object is given at once as the whole but only as something
existing for our awareness and not as fully known. In order to attain knowledge of the
object it is necessary to perform further ac ts of comparison by which the differences
between various aspects of the object are discovered and its distinction from other objects
is recognized."
As we can see, Lossky defends intellectual knowledge against Bergson's false
interpretation of its nature and function by showing its capacity of knowing reality in its
original wholeness. In the following quotations Lossky indicates the way in which his
own Intuitivism conceives of the nature of intellectual knowledge and how the formation
of concepts takes place.
"Directing acts of knowledge towards the ideal being, the intellect arrives at
knowledge of the universal expressed in universal concepts. From the fact th at living
reality is mutable and not repeatable it does not at all follow that universal concepts are
but subjective symbols. In events and processes there is creative mutability , but this does
not interfere with their possessing elements that are not in flux and in time. The
discursive thinking of the intellect intuiting the conjunction of certain aspects of the
object with others is also one kind of intuition; the intellect alone does not put together
aspects of the object but on the basis of seeing the whole object it grasps how its parts are
united in it. In this way we obtain in philosophy and in all other sciences logically exact
rational knowledge of genuine living beings. Such an epistemological system is not partial
but rather universal intuitivism; it is the doctrine according to which all forms of
knowledge are an immediate beholding of original being as it is in itself. It is, however,
necessary to remark that in spite of this intimate relation between the world and
ourselves our knowledge remains always incomplete. In fact, in order to attain knowledge
of various aspects of the object and of its relations to other objects, it is necessary to
perform the act of comparing one element of the object with others and with the
elements of other objects. However, in every such act we know only an infinitely small
part of the object, which is complex in itself as well as in its relations to the entire
universe. In order to obtain the complete fullness of knowledge even of such an object as
is a maple leaf lying in front of me, it would be necessary to perform an infinite number
of acts of analysis, which is impossible for man to do. Therefore our knowledge will
always remain incomplete and fragmentary." (Op. cit., p. 196)
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Professor Lossky also showed why, in his judgment, Bergson in describing and
interpreting our knowledge and its validity, has failed to reconcile the intuitive nature of
our knowledge with its intellectual and conceptual aspects and thus has not overcome the
epistemological dualism. The main reason for this dualistic solution was that Bergson at
the time of the development of his epistemology was metaphysically entangled in
pantheistic and biologistic actualism according to which the ultimate ontological reality
was a vital impulse (elan vital) whose nature Bergson described in terms of a monistic
energetism and not in categories of a matter-spirit dualism or ideal-real spiritualism.
"The negative attitude toward non-temporal being was perhaps Bergson's reason for
not having worked out a theory of the human "I" as the supratemporal substantial agent.
He conceived of man's personal life as a continuous creative flow of events intertwined
with one another so that we have always within us our past experiences. In this theory,
there is a valuable idea, i.e. the reminiscent function of our memory described as the
power of directing our attention to past event and of seeing it in its original and not in its
copy. However, if there is no "I" understood as a supratemporal agent, standing above
the stream of its own living experiences, then two shortcomings can be pointed out in
Bergson's theory. (1) We fail to see how man can direct his attention to any period of his
past experience, since he himself is nothing more than a continuous stream flowing in
time. (2) Bergson, defending the theory that the entire life of a person is a stream not cut
off from his past, can conceive free will only as an individual creative but never repeated
series of changes in which series every element comprises the whole of spiritual life. Such
a flow of life is not subjected to any laws but is distinquished through its individuality
from its entire past. For this reason Bergson's theory of free will is moderately
deterministic. The doctrine of the "I" conceived of as a supratemporal substantial agent,
enables us to develop a theory of free will according to which free will consists in the
independence of the agent from everything that happens in time even from his own past."
(Op. cit., pp. 196-197)
The quotation given above refers to a problem belonging to general metaphysics or to
the philosophy of man. In Lossky's Intuitivism, however, the question of free will also
has epistemological importance. It leads to the recognition of the necessity of the
supratemporal element that must be present in the knowing subject in order to render it
capable of making choices free from the extramental influences that, so to speak, attack
us from all directions in the form of external as well as internal stimuli provoking within
us cognitive responses and reactions. In this responsiveness of the knowing subject to
stimuli originating in the objects presenting themselves to our attention must be seen the
involvement of our free will together with our other faculties. Thus Intuitivism brings
into proper focus the simultaneous participation of all man's faculties in the knowing
process. It also places in proper perspective those subjective elements without which our
knowledge would be incapable of handling and controlling the physical-physiologica1
processes to which the causal theory of perception reduces our knowledge of extramental
reality. The intuitive theory of perception is thus a theory which opposes the causal
theory by defending the non-causal processes occurring in knowledge and by reducing the
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physicial-physiological processes to the status of mere causal stimuli and not causes of our
knowledge. Without the supratemporal and supraspatial "I" and without its free will, our
knowledge would not be possible because it would just be some sort of
physical-physiological stream of responses to sensory stimuli dominated by the blind
deterministic forces of a mechanistically interpreted psycho-physical universe against
which conception Bergson fought so vigorously.
In concluding his evaluation of Bergson's philosophy Lossky wrote:
"Despite its numerous shortcomings, Bergson's philosophy exercised a beneficial
influence upon contemporary philosophical thinking. By his doctrine of intuition as an
immediate grasp of reality and by his penetrating doctrine of the merely secondary role
of physical-physiological processes participating in perception and in memory he freed
many minds from more than two-hundred years enduring hypnotic spell inposed upon
them by the causal theory of perception." (Op. cit., p. 197)
Finally, we may introduce one more problem in which Professor Lossky rejected the
solution proposed by Bergson. This is the problem of the ontological status of sensory
qualities. Lossky, being an intuitive Realist, believed th at sensory qualities, b oth primary
and secondary, existed in external objects. Bergson considered them to be subjective, i.e.
created in our consciousness. Bergson's theory of sensory qualities is dependent on the
theory of memory developed by him in Matiere and Memoire in connection with the
immaterial acts performed by the knowing subject acting in the case of memory so that it
directs its acts of memory to past events themselves. These ac ts are not, according to
Bergson , identical with the physiological processes present in our so-called memory
images. Bergson distinguished two kinds of memory: (1) the habitual memory and (2) the
vision memory. The first memory is responsible for the formation of certain habits or
mechanism in our physiological processes th at accompany our psychic acts during the
process of memorizing. The second, the so-called vision-memory, consists in psychic acts
performed by the subject and focused on the past event entering into our consciousness
as the original past event. This is Bergson's non-causal or actualist theory of memory
consisting in the immaterial acts of the remembering and reminiscing subject where the
past event is seen as present in the consciousness in its original.
In applying this actualist theory of memory to the formation of sensory qualities,
Bergson taught that these sensory qualities which are supposed to exist in the objects, or
at least extramentally, such as colors, sounds, smells, etc., are, according to modern
physical science, streams of billions of vibrating light-waves, air-waves that move in space
with such great velocity that our sensory organs are unable to apprehend them. If they
could, says Bergson, our eyes would not see colors at all and our ears would not hear
sounds at all, because in themselves the bundles of vibrating waves are really not blue or
green, and the sound-waves are not sounding vibrations at all. Since our sensory organs
work only very slowly, they do not apprehend the original extramental vibrations. It is
our memory that preserves them in a very condensed form for our consciousness and this
condensed form preserved by the memory is the psychic quality , called a sensory quality,
created in our consciousness, i.e. red or blue color, or a certain quality of sound perceived
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by our sense of hearing. In denying, thus, that perceived sensory qualities belong to the
external physical vibrations of light and ethric waves, Bergson explained sensory qualities
analogously to the subjectivists and critical-realists according to whom sensory qualities are
not the properties of external objects.
To this Professor Lossky answered negatively:
"We cannot agree with the theory of Bergson in regard to colors and sounds. He thinks
that material processes corresponding to colors and sounds consist of vibrations of matter
of such high velocity that we are unable to distinguish them, and that because of this,
being preserved in memory, they are perceived by us as something undivided and as become
colored, sounding, etc. In reality, the non-distinguished vibrations can in no way become
red or blue, or sounding; they can have such qualities only in that case if they were
colored and sounding already in the process of vibrating." (Op. cit., p. 197)

E. Intuitivism and New Realism
Another epistemological school that is very similar to Lossky's Intuitivism is the
American New Realism and the English Realism of Samuel Alexander and John Laird.
Lossky welcomed the formulations worked out in 1912 by six New Realists in the
USA, E. Holt, W. Marvin, W. Montague, R. Perry, W. Pitkin, and E. Spaulding, regarding
the perception of external reality in its original, existing independently of knowing consciousness. As he himself had shown ten years before the appearance of The New Realism a
cooperative study published by the philosphers mentioned above, they too rejected the
subjectivist and critical-realist "copy" or image and symbol theories of perception. As
Lossky, they also presented their epistemological views in terms of a direct and
immediate-realistic position and phraseology as can be found in their "Program and First
. Platform of Six Realists" appended to the work published in 1912 (New York: The
Macmillan Co.,)
Thus Professor E. B. Holt states:
"1. The entities (objects, facts, etc.) under study in logic and the physical sciences are
not mental in any usual or proper meaning of the word 'mental'.
2. The being and nature of these entities are in no sense conditioned by their being
known.
3. The degree of unity, consistency, or connection subsisting among entities is a
matter to be empirically assertained.
4. In the present stage of our knowledge there is a presumption in favor of pluralism.
5. An entity antitity subsisting in certain relations to other entities enters into new relations without necessarily negating or altering its already subsisting relations.
6. No self-consistent or satisfactory logic (or system of logic) so far invente$1
countenances the 'organic' theory of knowledge or the 'internal' view of relations.
7. Those who assert this (anti-realistic) view, use in their exposition a logic which is
inconsistent with their doctrine." (Op. cit., p.472)

Published by eCommons, 1970

15

13

University of Dayton Review, Vol. 7 [1970], No. 2, Art. 2
Professor W. P. Montague, while establishing the meaning of Realism, says: "Realism
holds that things known may continue to exist unaltered when they are not known, or
that things may pass in and out of the cognitive relation without prejudice to their
reality, or that the existence of a thing is not correlated with or dependent upon the fact
that anybody experiences it, perceives it, or is in any way aware of it." (Op. cit., pA 74 )
Professor R. B. Perry states: "The object or content of consciousness is any entity in
so far as it is responded to by another entity in a specific manner exhibited by the reflex
nervous system. Thus physical nature, for example, is under certain circumstances,
directly present in consciousness. In its historical application, this means that Cartesian
dualism and the representative theory are false; and that attempts to overcome these by
reducing mind and nature to one another or to some third substance, are gratuitous. (2)
The specific response which determines an entity to be content of consciousness does not
directly modify such entities otherwise than to endow them with this content status. In
other words, consciousness selects from a field of entities which it does not create." (Op.
cit., pp. 475-476)
Professor W. B. Pitkin, while giving his criticism of the Idealistic and representational
theory of knowledge, states; "The Realist holds that things known are not products of
the knowing relation nor essentially dependent for their existence or behavior upon that
relation. This doctrine has three claims upon your acceptance: first, it is the natural,
instinctive belief of all men, and for this, if no other reaso n, puts the burden of proof
upon those who would discredit it; secondly; all refutations of it known to the present
writer presuppose or even actually employ some of its exclusive implications; and,
thirdly, it is logically demanded by all the observations and hypotheses of the natural
sciences, including psychology." (Op. cit., pA77)
Finally, Professor E. G. Spaulding formulates his realistic position as follows: "(1)
Realism, while admitting the tautology that every entity which is known is in relation to
knowing or experience or consciousness, holds that this knowing is eliminable, so that the
entity is known as it would be if the knowing were not taking place. Briefly, the entity is,
in its being, behavior, and character, independent of the knowing. This position agrees
with common sense and with science in holding (1) that not all entities are mental,
conscious, or spiritual, and (2) that entities are knowable without being known." (Op.cit.,
pA78)
The passages quoted above have proven the identity of the basic thesis defended by
Lossky's Intuitivism and by New Realism, i.e. that we do know the original reality.
However, Lossky, while referring to the New Realists very often in his later works and
acknowledging their significant and penetrating contributions to the clarification of many
epistemological questions, could not agree with their too materialistic and monistic
solutions. He criticized them and expressed his regret over the lack of metaphysical
foundations or rather over the naturalistic metaphysics they employed in their
explanations. In Lossky's view, it is necessary that whoever wishes to solve
epistemological problems with a final and satisfactory metaphysical analysis, must
elaborate a metaphysics in which beside material and physical elements the immaterial or
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ideal elements of being are present. Lossky has not accepted the solutions of the New
Realists as something possessing ultimate metaphysical validity, i.e. he was of the opinion
that their theories were justified by the natural sciences and by psychology; however,
they lacked a solid metaphysical grounding. This was possible only because the New
Realists dedicated themselves mostly to the perceptory processes and to the knowledge of
our extramental physical or material world. Had they immersed themselves into the more
complicated problems of our intellectual or conceptual knowledge, they would have
discovered that their theories of our immediate grasp of reality would have required the
admission of the supratemporal and supraspatial or ideal elements of being. For this
reason Lossky wrote in 1956 the following appraisal of New Realism:
"Their (the New Realists) new realism, like Intuitivism, contains the explicitly stated
doctrine that in the perception of the objects of the external world the original object
becomes present in our consciousness. Unfortunately, as James had done earlier, they too
explain this phenomenon as the point of intersection between the external world and the
individuality of the knowing Ego. For this reason they relativize material and psychic
being .... Despite this, however, it must be said that they deserve credit for having
worked out solutions of many partial problems. They analyze many instances when two
observers of one and the same object perceive it differently, and they show that such
instances do not prove the subjectivity of perception; such differences can be clarified by
pointing to the fact that the reality of the object itself comprises the qualities perceived
by the observers." (N.O. Lossky, A Popular Introduction to Philosophy, op. cit., p.
129)

F. Intuitivism and Thomistic Realism
The third school of epistemology which has many elements identical with Lossky's
Intuitivism is Thomism. In his personal discussions with the present writer, Professor
Lossky always expressed the highest respect for St. Thomas Aquinas and credited the
contributions of the Scholastics to the solution of epistemological questions with extreme
intellectual honesty and scholarly learning. In his Intuitivism he liked to point
out those doctrines in which he saw identity with the basic Thomistic positions.
He appreciated, in particular, the neo-Thomistic switch from the older copytheory posltlOn to the natural or immediate realistic position as developed
by Joseph Gredt, Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson, Francesco Morandini, and many
others.
Yet, despite this positive attitude, Lossky considered Thomistic realism too dependent
on Aristotelian influences both in metaphysics and in epistemology. Thus, he thought
that Thomistic realism was only half-way intuitive or immediate. In the knowledge crf
external reality , the Thomists believe with Lossky that the external object is known
immediately in the way it exists outside of the consciousness. However they do not
clearly state their understanding of the relationship between the metaphysical dualism
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which they profess and the epistemological theory they adhere to. Lossky believed that
Thomism must get rid of the halfway psychologization of our consciousness, i.e. it must
eliminate even the "medium quo" between the subject and the object known if by this
medium is meant an internal image present in the consciousness of the perceiving subject.
According to Lossky, the intentional acts exercised by the immaterial I (Ego) are in
themselves sufficient to reach the original object.
When reminded of the Thomist reasons for believing in the need for some
"intermediary" between the immaterial acts of perceiving, grasping and intuiting the
object, whether this be physical or abstracted idea, or conceptualized essence, and the
physico-physiological processes present in knowledge, Lossky pointed to the solution
given by Henri Bergson and other modern philosophers according to whom the
physico-physiological processes represen t only the stimulus and are not the cause
responsible for knowledge of the object. This position, in Lossky's view, is completely
congruent with the metaphysics and spiritualistic psychology accepted and espoused by
all Thomistic texts and authors. The Thomists must, in Lossky's view, work out their way
to supratemporal and supraspatial being not only in theology and metaphysics but also in
epistemology, i.e., they must employ their metaphysical dualism in their solution of
epistemoligical difficulties.
In reality, Lossky considered his Intuitivism to be more congruent with the basic
Thomistic principle that "immateriality is the root of cognition" (cognitio est in
immaterialitate), than is the position of some contemporary Thomists who insist on the
inseparable unity between the material and immaterial processes present in knowledge.
The famous objection raised against Plato by St. Thomas Aquinas in regard to the
impossibility of knowing immaterial natures or the essences of material objects
independently of the concrete things from which such essences are abstracted by the
agent intellect, Lossky answered by his theory of intellectual intuition. According to this
theory the intellect must see directly the ideal essence by the acts of contemplating
purely intellectually ideal being or relation and it is not forced to abstract it from the
concrete material object on which it is not unconditionally dependent. Nor is it
essentially dependent on the physico-physiological processes. Since these conditions may
be completely disregarded in certain circumstances and the spiritual element in the
knowing subject still reaches the object known, Lossky considered this theory to be
completely valid and the Thomistic objection as answered. Lossky, in support of his
theory, pointed to the familiar ESP phenomena and to other such mystical and
parapsychological occurences.
Thus, if we bear in mind the fact that the physico-physiological conditions are not
always necessary to our cognition of the object, which fact St. Thomas probably did not
analyze with due care because of his respect for Aristotle, it is possible to overcome the
discrepancy between the Thomistic and the Intuitivistic positions on this point.
On the other hand, it must be conceded that Lossky's solution depends too much on
his ideal-realistic ontology according to which the existence of supratemporal and
supraspatial entities is the ultimate raison-d'etre of all other events in the material and
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psychic realm of beings. Without such entities the solution given by Lossky's Intuitivism
would be impossibe and the only answer to the epistemological question, how do we
know material and immaterial reality, would have to be that given by Aristotle and his
followers. That answer is that we must start from the senses contacting the reality in itself
and the intellect then abstracts its conceptual contents from the material provided by the
senses. If this second way of access to our knowledge is not accepted, we are exposed to
complete scepticism and epistemological agnosticism.
Lossky has offered his Intuitivistic solution as the consequence of universal empiricism
resting on the intuitive nature of all types of knowledge, i.e. sensory, intellectual and
mystical. Thomism has accepted the intuitive nature of our sensory knowledge, but it
remains faithful to the traditional Aristotelian Abstractionism in the knowledge of
non-material entities that must always be abstracted from the concrete objects perceived
first by the senses. Thomism does not trust the intentional acts of our spiritual soul which
are too closely united with the material processes taking place in the human body in the
same way as the human soul is united with the human body in one human nature forming
one substance.
Intuitivism, deriving its theory of human nature from the more general metaphysical
point of view of the so-called personalistic and organic ideal-realistic structuring of the
whole Universe springing from the one, supraspatial and supratemporal absolute-concrete
principle, God, considers material processes to be of secondary importance and
dependent upon the ideal conditions which are primary ontologically and
epistemologically. This means that, according to Intuitivism, our knowledge is not
essentially different whether it takes place in this terrestrial condition or when the soul
will be separated from the physical body. The unity of the soul and the body cannot
hinder its spirituality in its cognitive efforts. Intuitivism respects the unity and
dependence of immaterial cognitive processes on their material conditions, but while
considering them only as stimuli, it cannot accept them as the primary factors in our
knowledge. Although Thomism always believed that our knowing processes must consist
of two kinds of acts, i.e. material and immaterial, it also placed the essence of knowledge
in immateriality. For this reason it was led into the half-way intuitivist and halfway
abstractionist interpretation of human knowledge.
In concluding this summary presentation, we may add that the differences between
Intuitivistic and Thomistic views may be removed at some future time when empirical
sciences will elaborate a new description of materiality and when the terms "matter" and
"material" will be conceived in the sense of the dynamic theory proposed by G. W.
Leibniz according to whom matter is nothing more than the acts of attraction and
repulsion performed by the monads, or "concrete-ideal substantival agents", to use the
terminology of Professor Lossky.
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1 Professor Nicholas Onufriyevich Lossky was born in a small village Kreslavka (in Vitebsk province,
Russia) on December 6, 1870. He studied the natural sciences and humanities at the university of St.
Petersburg earning degrees in both fields. He became a professor at the University of St. Petersburg
where he taught philosophy until the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. During the Revolution he lived
near Petrograd and later was transferred to Moscow by the new regime to work in the library. In
1922, N. O. Lossky was exiled by the Communist government with 150 other intellectuals and
scientists and settled in Prague, Czechoslovakia. There he taught at the newly established Russian
University, given to the Russian exiles by the Czechoslovakian government as an institution at which
they would continue their scientific work and educated their exiled students in their own national and
non-Marxist spirit. This institution was later abolished and Professor Lossky was given a teaching
position at the Czechoslovakian Charles' University in Prague and in Brno. In 1940 Hitler closed all
universities in Bohemia and Professor Lossky moved to Slovakia where he was given the chair of
philosophy at the Slovak State University in Bratislava (1942). Lossky taught at Bratislava university
until 1945. In June, 1945 he left for Paris to join his two sons Vladimir and Boris. From Paris he
went to New York where he taught at the Russian Orthodox School of Theology. After his
retirement, he lived with his son Andrew in Los Angeles, California, with whom he frequently visited
interesting cultural centers in the USA. Shortly before ill health completely prevented him from
continuing his work, he returned to France where he died on January 24, 1965 at the age of 95. He
is buried at Ste. Genvieve des Bois, near Paris.
2 In the History of Russian Philosophy Lossky defines his Intuitivism as "the doctrine that the
cognized object, even if it forms part of the external world, enters the knowing subject's
consciousness directly, soto speak in person, and is therefore apprehended as it exists independently
of the act of knowing. Such contemplation of other entities as they are in themselves is possible
because the world is an organic whole, and the knowing subject, the individual human self, is a
supertemporal and superspatial being, intimately connected with the whole world. The subject's
relation to all other entities in the world that render intuition possible is called by Lossky
epistemological coordination. That relation as such is not knowledge. In order that the object should
be not merely connected with the self but also cognized by it, the subject must direct upon it a
series of intentional mental acts of awareness, attention, differentiation, etc." (N. O. Lossky, History
of Russian Philosophy, New York, International Universities Press, 1951, pp. 252)
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